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The development of commercial launch systems has substantially reduced the cost of 
space launch. NASA’s space shuttle had a cost of about $1.5 billion to launch 27,500 kg to 
Low Earth Orbit (LEO), $54,500/kg. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 now advertises a cost of $62 million 
to launch 22,800 kg to LEO, $2,720/kg. Commercial launch has reduced the cost to LEO by 
a factor of 20. This will have a substantial impact on the space industry, military space, and 
NASA. Existing launch providers are reducing their costs and so are satellite developers. 
The military foresees an opportunity to rapidly replace compromised space assets that 
provided communications, weather, surveillance, and positioning. NASA supported the 
development of commercial space launch and NASA science anticipates lower cost missions, 
but human space flight planning seems unreactive. Specifically, it has been claimed that 
commercial spaceflight has not reduced the cost to provide cargo to the International Space 
Station (ISS). The key factor is that the space shuttle can provide cargo and crew to ISS 
while the Falcon 9 must also use the Dragon capsule, which adds cost and reduces payload. 
The cost of a Falcon 9 and Dragon capsule mission to ISS is about $140 million with a 
payload of 6,000 kg, $23,300/kg. The shuttle payload to ISS is less than to LEO, 16,050 kg, so 
its cost is also higher at $93,400/kg. The launch cost to ISS has been reduced by a factor of 4. 
Calculations that show commercial launch provides no cost reduction to ISS assume half the 
usually cited shuttle cost and allocate it to the actual delivered payload, about half the full 
capacity. In a split mission, with crew and pressurized cargo launched separately from 
hardware and materials, the higher Falcon 9 plus Dragon costs would apply only to a 
fraction of the launch mass. A 4 to 1 cost reduction saves most, 75%, of the total cost. A 
further reduction to 10 or 20 to 1 saves 90 or 95%, but this is only a small, 15 or 20%, 
portion of the original cost. The recently reduced space launch cost can be expected to 
substantially impact human space flight.  
Nomenclature 
DDT&E = Design, Development, Test and Evaluation 
ISS = International Space Station 
LEO = Low Earth Orbit 
NAFCOM = NASA Air Force Cost Model 
I. Introduction 
HE cost of space launch dropped from very high levels in the first decade of the space age but then remained 
high for decades and was especially high for the space shuttle. In the most recent decade, commercial rocket 
development has reduced the typical space launch cost by a factor of 20 while NASA’s launch cost to ISS has 
declined by a factor of 4.  
This paper reviews the history of the reduction in space launch costs, considers the reasons for the decline, and 
discusses the implications for space users. Very high launch cost was long considered the major impediment to 
space exploration and exploitation. Many technical approaches were suggested to reduce launch cost but none 
succeeded until commercially motivated suppliers bypassed the problems long inhibiting government sponsored 
rocket builders. Surprisingly, launch vehicle reuse - the most anticipated method to cut cost - has not so far actually 
cut cost and probably contributed to very high shuttle launch cost. The decline in launch costs has removed a major 
barrier and is expected to increase exploration, exploitation, and human expansion in space. The commercial market, 
the military, and NASA have responded differently due to their different goals and methods. Rocket builders and 
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users are reacting to market signals by cutting prices, and the military sees an opportunity to increase security using 
space, but NASA seems slower to adapt.  
II. The history of space launch costs 
The mass that launch systems can deliver depends on the destination orbit. Launch systems are usually compared 
using the launch cost per kilogram to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The cost for cargo to the International Space Station 
(ISS) is higher since the payload is lower because ISS is in a higher inclination orbit to accommodate Russian 
launch sites.  
A. Launch cost per kilogram to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
Figure 1 shows the launch cost per kilogram to LEO in current dollars for various launch systems plotted against 
the first system launch date. The data is taken from Table A1 in Appendix A. The usual approach is to compare 
launch costs per kilogram by dividing the total cost per flight by the maximum payload delivered to LEO. Smaller 
payloads, payload accommodation systems, and limited payload volume often increase the launch cost per kilogram.  
 
 
Figure 1. Launch cost per kilogram to LEO versus first launch date. 
 
The major impression given by Figure 1 is of two large initial and recent cost drops with a long intermediate 
period of more constant cost. Three early systems had launch costs to LEO above $100 k/kg, even approaching 
$1,000 k/kg. Vanguard was the first and by far most expensive launch system. Costs dropped rapidly to the Saturn V 
used for Apollo, which still has the lowest historical cost except for three Soviet systems and the two recent Falcons. 
Vanguard’s launch cost was about 170 times that of the Saturn V.  
The average launch cost did not change much from 1970 to 2000, especially since many systems with initial 
flight before 2000 continue to be used. From 1970 to 2000 the average launch cost was $18.5 k/kg, with a typical 
range of $10 to $32 k/kg. Of the 22 systems initially launched from 1970 to 2000, only 7 have costs below $10 k/kg, 
Vanguard 
Shuttle 
Falcon 9 
Falcon Heavy 
Saturn V 
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and they are all Soviet or Chinese and their cost may be subsidized. Only 2 systems have costs above $32 k/kg, the 
shuttle at $61.7 k/kg and the small and costly Pegasus.  
A major drop in cost occurred in 2010 with the Falcon 9 at $2.7 k/kg. The Falcon Heavy reduces the cost to $1.4 
k/kg. Shuttle’s launch cost was about 20 times that of the Falcon 9 and about 40 times that of the Falcon Heavy. The 
average 1970 to 2000 launch cost of $18.5 k/kg is reduced by a factor of 7 for the Falcon 9 and and 13 for the 
Falcon Heavy. (Costs from Appendix A are in 2018 dollars. Some differ from unadjusted costs in the abstract.)  
B. Launch cost per kilogram to the International Space Station (ISS) 
Table 1 shows the launch cost of the space shuttle and Falcon 9 plus Dragon to the International Space Station 
(ISS). The numbers are taken from Appendix B:  
 
         Table 1. Total launch cost to ISS for space shuttle and Falcon 9 plus Dragon.  
System Shuttle Falcon 9 plus Dragon 
Total cost per launch, 2018 $M 1,697 150 
kg to ISS 16,050 6,000 
Total 2018 $k/kg 105.8 25 
 
The Falcon 9 plus Dragon reduce the space shuttle cost to ISS by about a factor of 4. The cost reduction factor 
for cargo to ISS is much less than the reduction factor for LEO, but it is still a significant cost reduction. 
III. The reasons for the decline in launch costs 
The technical problems leading to high space launch costs have been identified and cures proposed, but the long 
delay until the recent reduction in launch costs suggests that cultural and institutional barriers have hindered 
implementing potential technical improvements. The next sections discuss the technical and institutional reasons for 
the decline in launch costs.  
A. Technical causes and cures of very high space launch cost  
After an initial decline at the beginning of the space age, Western launch costs have remained very high and 
relatively constant until recently. High launch costs have been “the greatest limiting factor to expanded space 
exploitation and exploration.” (Wertz and Larson, 1996, pp. 115-7) 
The technical causes of high launch cost have been assessed as follows:  
1. Goal of maximum performance and minimum weight, originally from ballistic missiles 
2. Higher cost of expendables versus reusables 
3. High cost of human spaceflight 
4. High cost of new technology, hardware, and software 
5. Low failure tolerance and consequent intense design effort and detailed oversight 
6. High system complexity, parts counts, and number of interfaces (Wertz and Larson, 1996, pp. 126-33) 
Commercial launchers saved initial development cost by using missile designs, but missiles are designed for 
high performance, not minimum cost. Comparing rockets to aircraft, it seems that reusability is the obvious path to 
reducing costs, but the example of the space shuttle does not support this. Reusable rockets have higher development 
costs and reduced payload due to the need for landing fuel. The Falcon 9 is reusable and has been reused, but the 
projected cost savings remain in the future. Human spaceflight adds costs for life support, higher reliability, and man 
rating. Commercial and military payloads are expensive and there is low tolerance for failure. Development and 
production cost increases with system complexity. (Wertz and Larson, 1996, pp. 126-33) 
The possible technical approaches to cut launch cost have been assessed as follows:  
1. Simplify the vehicle configuration 
2. Increase vehicle production and launch rates 
3. Use industrial design and production methods (cultural change)  
4. Optimize for minimum cost 
5. Reduce the parts count 
6. Increase simplicity and design margins 
7. Reduce instrumentation 
8. Design for production and operation (Wertz and Larson, 1996, pp. 147-53) 
One study suggested that the record low cost of the Saturn V could be reduced by a factor of 5, to a cost similar 
to the Falcon Heavy. The Pegasus system achieved low development cost using a commercial off-the-shelf 
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approach, but because of its small payload it had the second highest launch cost in recent decades. Wider design 
margins can accommodate weight growth without costly last minute weight reducing efforts, help avoid 
miniaturization, and allow redundancy rather than intensive design to increase reliability. (Wertz and Larson, 1996, 
pp. 148, 149, 154) 
“To make significant reductions in launch costs, new ‘clean sheet’ launch systems must be developed. … 
institutional barriers within government and industry have prevented major inroads is cost reduction.” (Wertz and 
Larson, 1996, p. 155) The long awaited large reduction in launch cost has now been achieved, but what were the 
“institutional barriers” that delayed this?  
B. Institutional causes and cures of very high space launch cost  
The high cost of ordinary launch vehicles, the higher cost of the space shuttle, and the success of SpaceX can all 
be explained by institutional causes.  
Some of the institutional causes of high cost for ordinary launch vehicles were mentioned above, including 
military heritage, need for high reliability, and a non-industrial culture. The fundamental cause of the past high 
commercial launch cost seems to be lack of competition. The US launch industry has been a monopoly, the United 
Launch Alliance (ULA), and its main customer has been the US government, NASA and the military, which need 
high reliability and had little incentive to exert cost pressure. The ULA lost most of the commercial market to Russia 
and Arianespace which are also heavily subsidized by their governments. (Zimmerman, 2012)  
The space shuttle had unique NASA cost drivers. About one-fourth of the shuttle operational costs went for “the 
general area of NASA center and program support, maintenance of capability, and product improvement.” “Another 
major cost driver in Shuttle is launch operations costs. The fact that 10,000 contractors and 1,000 civil service are 
needed … is indicative of the lack of operational simplicity. This marching army plus mission operations and crew 
operations personnel make up one third of the overall shuttle operations costs. The low Shuttle flight rate not only 
makes for inefficient use of personnel and facilities, it distorts the cost per flight calculations because of high fixed 
costs.” (Rutledge, 93-4063)  
SpaceX has low costs largely because it is vertically integrated, with largely in-house development of the 
components of its rockets. It carries out all phases of the product lifecycle, including design, engineering, 
manufacturing, software, integration, testing, launch, and operations. Most activities have been in a single large 
facility. The competing ULA is a systems integrator and launch operator with hundreds of subcontractors that have 
dozens of facilities spread all over the country, which is a political necessity for a government funded jobs program. 
SpaceX designs for simplicity, for instance the Falcon 9 uses 9 identical engines. The Falcon Heavy effectively uses 
three Falcon 9’s. Another key factor in SpaceX’s low costs is its young, highly motivated workforce of top 
graduates willing to work significant unpaid overtime. SpaceX uses state of the art automated manufacturing 
equipment “previously unheard of in the space industry, where hand assembly of components is still the norm.” 
(Greg, 2015)  
In 2010, NASA compared SpaceX’s cost to develop the Falcon 9 to the cost NASA’s models predicted using the 
traditional cost-plus-fee method. Using the NASA-AF Cost Model (NAFCOM), NASA estimated that it would have 
cost NASA $1,383 million to develop these systems using traditional contracting. The estimated SpaceX cost was 
$443 million, a 68% reduction from the traditional approach. SpaceX attributed their cost efficiencies to a few key 
factors:  
1. Smaller workforce 
2. Use of in-house development 
3. Fewer management layers and less infrastructure 
4. Commercial development culture 
The cost of Design, Development, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) depends primarily on the size of the workforce 
needed. SpaceX estimates that subcontracting one dollar’s worth of in-house work would cost three to five dollars 
due to subcontractor overhead and profit. The commercial development approach includes a firm fixed price versus 
cost plus, no oversight, fixed requirements, disciplined systems engineering, and fixed funding instead of annual 
budgeting. (NASA, 2011)  
Perhaps the the key determinant of SpaceX’s lower cost was that modern management allowed a highly effective 
engineering effort. “SpaceX’s approach to rocket design, which stems from one core principle: Simplicity enables 
both reliability and low cost.” All the Falcon 9 engines are identical where other rockets use two or three to gain 
performance at higher cost. The Falcon 9 avionics and controls are triple-redundant. Elon Musk, SpaceX’s CEO, is 
also chief engineer and he claims. “I know my rocket inside out and backward.” The frequent management -
engineering conflict of goals and communications gap seem eliminated. SpaceX’s organizational style is Silicon 
Valley, not NASA. “(T)he buzzwords of the business culture—lean manufacturing, vertical integration, flat 
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management—are real and fundamental. … This really is the greatest innovation of SpaceX: It’s bringing the 
standard practices of every other industry to space.” (Chaikin, 2012)  
C. Will space launch cost go lower?  
There are many reasons to expect that space launch costs will go lower, even much lower. These include launch 
vehicle reuse, an expanded market due to lower cost, increased commercial competition, better management and 
engineering, and technical advances.  
The reuse of rockets and entire launch vehicles has been considered important in reducing launch cost, but so far 
reuse has not led to lower cost. The space shuttle was extremely expensive, largely due to the high cost of 
refurbishing the shuttle between flights. The Falcon 9 was designed to be reused, at a significant increase in 
development cost, but so far it has been reused only a few times. Falcon 9 reuse may reduce costs by a factor of two. 
“SpaceX president Gwynne Shotwell told the Space Symposium conference that the cost of refurbishing the Falcon 
9 rocket that originally flew the CRS-8 Space Station resupply mission last year for SES-10 was ‘substantially less 
than half’ what it would have cost to build a brand new one.” (Morris, 2017)  
Reuse might provide much more drastic cost reductions. Elon Musk believes that the new Raptor engine can 
achieve full reusability of all rocket stages and “a two order of magnitude reduction in the cost of spaceflight” to $10 
per pound by 2025. (Wang, 2016)  
General market and competitive effects could lead to further cost reduction. The lower cost of launch should lead 
to an increased number of space flights, which would lead to cost reduction due to the learning curve, to reliability 
growth due to failure mode discovery and repair, and would more quickly pay back the initial development cost and 
so justify more investment in launcher design. Previously the launch market belonged to a limited number of 
government supported entities possibly more concerned with military capability, launch reliability, national prestige, 
and creating jobs and economic stimulus than with reducing costs or developing new technology. The commercial 
rocket business has provided a different engineering-savvy business model that has greatly reduced costs. A growing 
more competitive market will tend to favor technology advances that cut cost and improve performance.  
IV. The implications of the decline in launch costs 
High launch costs have been considered the major barrier to further advances in space. Lower launch costs are 
expected to increase exploration, exploitation, and human expansion. The major customers for launch services are 
commercial satellites, the military, and NASA. The commercial market, the military, and civilian government are 
three different sectors of society, with different roles, goals, and characteristic approaches. The expected impact of 
lower costs has been different for commercial satellites, the military, and NASA.  
A. The lower launch costs will affect missions, spacecraft design, and space business 
High launch costs have affected all aspects of space planning. High launch costs have been the greatest factor 
limiting the number and reducing the scope of space missions. Reduced launch cost will directly allow more, bigger, 
better missions. (Wertz and Larson, 1996, p. 117)  
High launch costs lead to high spacecraft costs through “intense pressure to make every kilogram of the 
spacecraft pack as much performance and capability as possible.” (Wertz and Larson, 1996, p. 154) Space hardware 
must be very light and so it tends to be fragile, creating a problem during launch. Weight removal is difficult and 
requires extensive analysis and testing to ensure surviving launch. Reliable, tested and proven, standard, inexpensive 
off-the-shelf systems can not be used because of their weight. Using more mass allows increased design margins, 
use of redundancy, and operational robustness. (Wertz and Larson, 1996, p. 154) Reduced launch cost will directly 
allow heavier, more robust and reliable, and better performing spacecraft to be developed at lower cost.  
Low cost commercial launch “will change our lives. The development of a robust space economy promises 
growth, astounding new products and services, amazing high-tech jobs and a quantum leap in our national security 
capabilities.” “Launch cost has always been the primary constraint in the space business. If access to space weren’t 
so expensive we’d have an astounding amount of entrepreneurial activity in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and beyond. 
Space tourism, materials development, pharmaceutical research, power generation, communications, earth imaging 
and national security all have “killer apps” just waiting for reliable and affordable access to space.” (Autry, 2017)  
B. The commercial satellite market reaction to lower launch costs 
Until the 2000’s, communications satellites were the principal commercial launch market. The total number of 
commercial launches was roughly 25 to 35 per year until the Falcon 9 expanded the market and became the largest 
supplier, passing the Ariane 5. Communications satellites use a limited number of internationally allocated 
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geosynchronous slots. The commercial satellite launch market is far from an open and competitive market, since 
most suppliers and customers have been government regulated and subsidized. Prices can be affected by political 
reasons.  
In a restricted market, lower costs might not have much impact. None the less, “Satellite design and 
manufacturing is beginning to take advantage of these lower-cost options for space launch services.” And, “(T)he 
satellite manufacturing industry may ‘experience a shock similar to what the launcher industry is experiencing’” 
(Wikipedia, Space launch market competition) Ultimately, a commercial market tends to reduce costs and improve 
performance.  
C. The military space reaction to lower launch costs 
The military is eager to take advantage of lower launch costs, which provide a forceful and dramatic solution to 
vital current problems. The United States’ military capabilities greatly depend on space assets, including 
communications, global positioning, weather, and surveillance satellites. Satellites are vulnerable to attack and 
difficult to hide or defend, so the ability to rapidly and cheaply replace them is very attractive. “Recent private sector 
developments in access to space could open the door for a new concept for airpower. If realized these capabilities 
could fundamentally change the USAF’s power projection paradigm, while building new strategic options for the 
nation.” (Air University, 2017, p. ii) 
The Air University white paper explains the problem and proposed solution. “(O)ur current space architecture 
grows increasingly vulnerable.” “Fast Space envisions sortie-on-demand launch capability, made possible through 
economically viable business cases, high launch rates, sustainably lower costs, rapid turn-around, and higher 
reliability.” This provides “The ability to immediately deliver additional effects worldwide such as precision 
navigation and timing, electronic warfare, cyber effects, directed energy, kinetic attack, and rapid global transport of 
cargo and personnel.” “In short, competition in space has returned. Space is congested and contested and our 
advantages in space can no longer be assured. The US military depends on space assets that are increasingly at risk 
of attack.” (Air University, 2017, pp. 1, 2, 7) Low cost space launch provides the solution to urgent current military 
problems and could enable a new era of US military dominance through control of space.  
The Air University report characterizes NASA’s launch system efforts as directly leading to higher costs than a 
commercial approach. “A government agency, even a well-run agency, does not have the correct economic 
incentives to lower costs. NASA was not incentivized to eliminate the operational and labor costs that were part of 
the Shuttle system. Since NASA depends on political support, which is driven by the number of jobs in 
congressional districts, the opposite is true. America has proven over its history that private industry, properly 
incentivized in a pro-competition environment, is much more successful at lowering costs.” “NASA chose the 
highest technical risk solution from among the three major X-33 bids, as they gave higher points to the bidders with 
the ‘most new technology’… This is the exact opposite of how almost any commercial firm would have evaluated 
the process, as ‘technical risk’ is something to be eliminated and mitigated before taking a product or service to 
market.” “The NAI had to make everybody happy, so it included a significant piece of work for all parties. The 
‘political process’ required to achieve buy-in and consensus significantly increased the estimated price.” (Air 
University, 2017, pp. A-2, 3) 
D. The NASA manned space reaction to lower launch costs 
Even though NASA has enabled and supported the development of commercial space launch, its success may 
compete with NASA’s in-house rocket development and disrupt NASA’s current vision of space exploration. NASA 
appears much less willing than some in the military to accept and exploit the new lower launch costs. This is 
especially true in life support, where the key choice is between direct supply of consumables with high launch mass 
versus recycling to reduce launch mass. Recycling was long thought thought to be necessary on all long human 
missions due to the historically very high launch cost per kilogram. Now resupply may be much cheaper as well as 
much more reliable than recycling. (Jones, 2017-87) 
Some in NASA think the new lower launch costs are exaggerated or even nonexistent. In 2008, NASA signed a 
contract with SpaceX for 12 launches at a cost of $1.6 billion. NASA payload specialist and space station engineer 
Ravi Margasahayam, speaking as a private citizen, stated, “My cost per pound went up with these rockets. On the 
shuttle, it would be much less.” “Margasahayam points out that, while the space shuttles were more expensive — a 
whopping $500 million per launch (or possibly $1.5 billion, according to one analysis we've seen) — each mission 
carried about 50,000 lbs. (plus seven astronauts!). That means each pound of cargo used to cost about $10,000 to 
ship on a shuttle.” “For SpaceX - the cheapest of NASA's new carriers - dividing the cost of each launch ($133 
million) by the cargo weight of its most recent resupply mission (5,000 lbs.) gives you about $27,000 per pound 
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($59.5 k/kg). But that's a high estimate. SpaceX told Tech Insider that its Dragon cargo spacecraft launched on a 
Falcon 9 rocket can carry up to 7,300 lbs.” (Kramer and Mosher, 2016)  
How do these numbers check? For space shuttle, the quoted article notes that Margasahayam’s cost to launch 
was too low. (Kramer and Mosher, 2016) Using $1.5 billion rather than $500 million would increase his computed 
shuttle launch cost by a factor of three, to $30,000 per pound or $66 k/kg. And there is a further correction. The 
shuttle carried 27,500 kg (60,000 lb) to LEO, but only 16,050 kg (35,380 lb) to ISS. (Wikipedia, Space Shuttle) A 
better cost for shuttle launch to ISS is $1.5 billion/16,050 kg = $93.4 k/kg. And the SpaceX potential payload to ISS 
is 6,000 kg. (Spacex.com, 2018) (Wikipedia, SpaceX Dragon) 133 million/6,000 kg = $22.2 k/kg. This shows that 
SpaceX provides a cost reduction to ISS by a factor of 4. A more direct calculation in Appendix B gives a similar 
result.  
The NASA engineer’s casual analysis made two mistaken assumptions that favored shuttle over commercial 
launch. They may be derived from similar mistakes in an earlier NASA estimate provided to Congress. The space 
shuttle cost per pound to ISS was “Calculated assuming four missions per year with a capability to deliver 16 metric 
tons (35,264 pounds) to the space station at a total annual program cost of $3.0 Billion. $3,000,000,000 ÷ (4 flights 
× 35,264 pounds/flight) = $21,268 per pound.” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2011, p. 5) This $21,268 per pound 
is equivalent to $46.8 k/kg and is too low by half because of the too low by half ($750 million) shuttle cost per 
launch. The NASA estimate supplied to the House for commercial resupply to ISS was $26.77 k/lb or $58.9 k/kg, 
which is similar to the cost for Falcon 9 of $59.5 k/kg computed above, which was based on the 2008 contract cost 
and actual rather than potential payload. Some comments were critical, such as “the numbers announced by this 
House report are garbage.” (Zimmerman, 2011) Unlike the military, which embraced and emphasized the benefits of 
lower space launch cost, NASA has denied and clearly underestimated them.  
E. Factors other than launch costs 
The space shuttle had some capabilities that the Falcon 9 lacks. The Falcon 9 payload to ISS is much lower than 
shuttle due to the need for the Dragon capsule, even though the payloads to LEO are similar. The Falcon Heavy 
payload to LEO is more than twice the space shuttle’s. (Spacex.com, 2018) The Falcon 9 and Dragon are expected 
to carry crew to the ISS, but the shuttle also could sustain a crew in orbit for weeks and had a large workspace in the 
payload bay. Both the space shuttle and Falcon 9 can return cargo to Earth.  
The Falcon 9’s cost to NASA is lower than shuttle’s because Falcon 9 launch is a contracted service rather than 
supported by an in-house capability. Most Falcon 9 launches are commercial, so the cost of development and 
operations is spread over many launches per year. NASA shuttle management was well aware of this cost spreading 
effect and initially planned to have all US launches, commercial, military, and NASA science, use the shuttle. After 
Challenger, most space shuttle flights were restricted to building the ISS or where humans were needed, as in 
Hubble repair. The low flight rate of the space shuttle was a major factor in its high cost. (Rutledge, 93-4063) 
V. Conclusion 
The cost of space launch has been substantially reduced. This provides greatly expanded opportunities to exploit 
space for commercial users, the military, and NASA. The commercial competitive launch approach sponsored by 
NASA provided an unconstrained environment that allowed a focused management to cut costs using good 
engineering. Competition drives innovation and forces efficiency, cuts costs and creates new opportunities.  
The commercial low launch cost opportunity, competing foreign space efforts, and a possible new military push 
into space suggest that NASA should plan for lower launch costs and try to increase the number and size of 
missions. The previous assumptions and design decisions made for the space station should be reconsidered, 
especially the use of recycling rather than resupply for life support. Further commercialization may be 
advantageous.  
Appendix A: Launch cost to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
Table A1 shows the first launch date and the launch cost to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) in current dollars for many 
historical rocket systems. Most of the data was obtained from past compilations, but the Saturn V, Space shuttle, 
Falcon 9, and Falcon Heavy launch costs are calculated below.  
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Table A1. Launch cost to LEO in current dollars.  
System First launch date $k/kg Reference 
Ariane 44 1988 17.9 Wertz and Larson, 1996 
Ariane 5G 1996 13.1 Futron, 2002  
Athena 1 1995 31.7 Wertz and Larson, 1996 
Athena 2 1995 16.6 Futron, 2002 
Atlas IIA 1991 19.8 Wertz and Larson, 1996 
Atlas-Centaur 1964 28.0 Koelle, 1991 
Cosmos 1967 12.4 Futron, 2002  
Delta 3910 1975 28.0 Koelle, 1991 
Delta E 1960 167.8 Koelle, 1991 
Delta II 1989 15.3 Futron, 2002 
Delta III 1998 11.7 Koelle, 1991 
Dnepr 1999 4.9 Futron, 2002 
Falcon 9 2010 2.7 SpaceX.com, 2018 
Falcon Heavy 2018 1.4 SpaceX.com, 2018 
H-2 1994 26.4 Wertz and Larson, 1996 
Kosmos 1967 8.0 Wikipedia, Comparison, 2018 
Long March 2C 1974 10 Futron, 2002 
Long March 2E 1971 7.7 Wertz and Larson, 1996 
Long March 3B 1984 6.3 Futron, 2002 
Pegasus XL 1990 43.5 Futron, 2002  
Proton SL-13 1965 4.1 Wertz and Larson, 1996 
Rockot 1994 10.4 Futron, 2002  
Saturn V 1968 5.2 Williams, 2016 
Saturn IB 1966 17.3 Koelle, 1991 
Scout 1961 111.8 Koelle, 1991 
Space shuttle 1981 61.7 Pielke and Byerly, 2011 
Soyuz 1966 7.6 Futron, 2002  
Start 1993 16.7 Futron, 2002 
Taurus 1989 20.4 Wertz and Larson, 1996 
Titan II 1962 31.0 Wertz and Larson, 1996 
Titan IV 1989 24.7 Wertz and Larson, 1996 
Titan-Centaur 1974 11.2 Koelle, 1991 
Vanguard 1957 894.7 Koelle, 1991 
Vega 2012 10.0 Wikipedia, Comparison, 2018 
Zenit 2 1985 4.4 Futron, 2002 
Zenit 3SL 1999 7.6 Futron, 2002 
 
The costs were corrected from the reported basis years to current dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
(CPI Inflation Calculator, 2018) The data of Table A1 are plotted in Figure 1 of the main text.  
Table A2 shows the computation of the launch cost per kilogram to LEO in current dollars for the Saturn V, 
space shuttle, Falcon 9, and Falcon Heavy.  
 
Table A2. Launch cost to LEO for Saturn V, space shuttle, Falcon 9, and Falcon Heavy.  
System Saturn V Shuttle Falcon 9 Falcon Heavy 
kg to LEO 140,000 27,500 22,800 63,800 
Cost per launch, 2018 $M  728   1,697   62   90  
2018 $k/kg 5.20   61.72   2.72   1.41  
Reference Williams, 2016 Pielke and Byerly, 2011 SpaceX.com, 2018 SpaceX.com, 2018 
 
These costs are used in Table A1. The cost reduction factor from shuttle to Falcon 9 is about 23. 
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Appendix B: Launch cost to to the International Space Station (ISS) 
The space shuttle carried 27,500 kg to LEO but only 16,050 kg to ISS. (Wikipedia, Space Shuttle) The cost per 
kilogram for shuttle launch to ISS was $1,697 M/16,050 kg = $105.8 k/kg in current dollars using the shuttle cost 
from Table A2.  
In 2008 NASA awarded a $1.6 billion to SpaceX for 12 cargo delivery flights to ISS. (Wikipedia, SpaceX 
Dragon) The cost per launch in current dollars is $1,792 million/12 = $149 M/launch. This cost is higher than the 
$62 M for a Falcon 9 launch because of the added requirement for the cargo-containing Dragon capsule. NASA 
awarded five more cargo-supply missions to SpaceX in late 2015, with an undisclosed cost estimated at $140 or 150 
million per launch, $144 to 154 million in current dollars. (de Selding, 2016) The costs were corrected from the 
reported basis years to current dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). (CPI Inflation Calculator, 2018) The 
average current cost estimate is about 150 million.  
Each 2008 contract launch was required to carry 5,000 lbs (2,273 kg) to ISS, but the potential payload to ISS is 
much larger than the contract minimum, 6,000 kg. (Spacex.com, 2018) (Wikipedia, SpaceX Dragon) The cost for 
Falcon 9 and Dragon cargo to ISS is $150 M/6,000 kg = $25 k/kg, 24% of the shuttle cost to ISS and a reduction by 
a factor of 4.2. The cost reduction factor for cargo to ISS is much less than the reduction factor for LEO, but it is still 
a significant cost reduction. 
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